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Abstract
This paper investigates the welfare e®ects of trade liberalization by exploiting a natural
policy experiment in the small open economy of Cyprus. A 1993 law relaxed import restric-
tions on used vehicles and facilitated the °ow of used Japanese vehicles into the country.
This led to a dramatic shift of consumer purchases from new to used cars and a substantial
expansion of the overall market. Estimated welfare gains are of the order of several hundred
dollars per purchaser. The ¯ndings are indicative of the potential for substantial gains from
liberalizing trade in used goods, which could also alter trade °ows and production.
Keywords: automobile industry, di®erentiated products, gains from trade, used goods, trade
liberalization.
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It is often said that if there is one thing that all economists agree on, it is in the merits of free
trade. This belief is supported by an extensive body of international trade theory that demon-
strates how gains from trade can arise through a variety of channels. Classical trade theory has
focused on the gains from pure exchange and from specialization. More recent work has empha-
sized other channels such as preference heterogeneity and imperfect competition. For example,
gains from trade can be realized when markets are imperfectly competitive because opening up
to trade increases competition between domestic and foreign ¯rms. Or, when consumers have
heterogeneous preferences, trade can raise welfare by increasing the number of product varieties
available to consumers.
Despite economists' strong convictions, free trade remains a highly controversial issue. At
least part of the reason is that empirical evidence on the existence and magnitude of gains from
trade is surprisingly tenuous. This is not due to lack of e®ort; applied economists have produced
numerous papers aiming to assess the impact of trade on the world's economies. Although the
overall evidence is generally thought to be positive, it is certainly not conclusive. The macro
literature has used cross-country growth regressions as the main tool to investigate the link
between trade with economic growth. The idea is that if open economies grow faster, this would
be evidence of the bene¯ts of trade. Most studies ¯nd some evidence linking trade and growth
but the conclusion is tainted by methodological and data problems.1
Micro studies aim to identify the e®ects of trade at the industry and ¯rm level. They use
¯rm- or plant-level data from manufacturing surveys to measure the e®ects of trade liberaliza-
tion on things like productivity, price-cost margins, product variety, and technological di®usion.
An early example is Levinsohn's (1993) study of Turkey's trade liberalization experiment. The
author found that price-cost margins in most industrial sectors decreased in the aftermath of
liberalization. He interpreted this as evidence that trade liberalization imposes \market disci-
pline" by increasing competition. Many other studies have been produced since, many of which
report similar ¯ndings. According to Tybout's (2003) comprehensive overview of this literature,
the studies ¯nd that increased trade causes domestic ¯rms in import-competing sectors to shrink
in size, production to be allocated more e±ciently among plants of di®erent productivity levels,
and price-cost margins to fall.
These studies have contributed immensely to our understanding of ¯rm responses to policy
1Supplementary evidence comes other sources, such as country studies. See Harrison and Hanson (1999) and
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for critical overviews of the macro literature.
1instruments, but they do have some limitations. Because they use ¯rm-level as opposed to
product-level data, they have little to say about what happens to prices and market shares in
speci¯c markets as a result of trade liberalization. Also, trade liberalization is frequently accom-
panied by other structural changes like ¯nancial liberalization, exchange rate adjustments, better
enforcement of competition policy, etc. It is not always obvious that the bene¯ts documented
in these studies should be attributed solely to trade liberalization.
In this paper I sidestep these issues by focusing on a speci¯c experiment in trade liberalization
in a single product market of a small economy.2 By doing so I am able to focus on the speci¯cs
of the market and isolate the e®ects of trade liberalization on local market structure, prices and
consumer welfare. Even though the particular market may be too small to allow for sweeping
general conclusions, the strength of the results and the uniqueness of the setting are highly
instructive. Speci¯cally, in 1993 Cyprus relaxed import restrictions on used automobiles by
raising the maximum allowable age of an imported used vehicle from two to ¯ve years. This
policy change facilitated the mass importation of used Japanese vehicles into the country and
made Cyprus the theater of a fascinating policy experiment. Used Japanese imports were in very
good condition, they came with many extras, and were selling at prices considerably lower than
those prevailing in the local secondary market at the time. The consequences were dramatic.
Registrations of used imports shot up from 7.2% of all ¯rst-time car registrations in 1992 to
a high of 72.4% in 1998; they have since settled down to about 60%. This change was driven
by two e®ects. First, there was a switch from new cars to used imports. Second, there was an
overall market expansion as many consumers saw the opportunity to upgrade their existing car
or buy a second one. There is also evidence that prices of new cars dropped in the aftermath of
the policy change, presumably as a response to increased competition.
In order to quantify the welfare impact I estimate a di®erentiated product demand system
for the Cyprus automobile market. Demand estimates are used to compute consumer welfare
and compare the results to the counterfactual scenario of no policy change. I ¯nd that the in°ux
of used cars led to welfare gains of the order of several hundred dollars per purchaser, peaking at
over a thousand dollars in 1998. Interestingly, most of the gains were due to the introduction of
new products rather than the drop in prices of existing products. This ¯nding provides strong
support for theories suggesting that increased product variety is an important bene¯t of trade
liberalization, perhaps more important than increased competition. I also estimate that the new
policy led to a sizeable increase in tax revenue for the government.
2Few studies have analyzed the e®ects of trade liberalization on speci¯c markets. One exception is Nagaoka
and Kimura (1999), who study the e®ects of import liberalization in the Japanese oil product market. The authors
argue that liberalization lowered prices by causing the collapse of the domestic oil cartel.
2An additional important contribution of this study is that it brings attention to international
markets for used goods. Secondary markets have received considerable attention in the industrial
organization literature, yet the rami¯cations of international trade in used goods have largely
been ignored. This may be at least part of the reason why substantial trade barriers persist in
many used good markets, and in particular the market for used automobiles. Many countries
maintain severe restrictions on imports of used goods, even as they open up their other markets to
foreign competition. Even within \free" trade zones, such as NAFTA and Mercosur, exceptions
are made for used goods, and particularly for cars. For example, Mexican tari®s on used cars
are not expected to be phased out until 2019. Despite these barriers, an international market
for used automobiles does exist and it can only get bigger as trade barriers are removed. The
policy analyzed in this paper provides an instructive account of the possibilities opened by
increased trade in used goods and points to interesting questions regarding its possible e®ects
on international trade °ows and production.
2 Global trade in used goods and the market for used cars
Sen (1962) is thought to have been the ¯rst to point out the scope for international trade in used
machines. He attributed this trade opportunity to di®erential maintenance costs that arise due
to the lower wages in underdeveloped countries. The implication is that used machines should
be exported from high-wage to low-wage countries. Smith (1974, 1976) and Bond (1983) used
this insight to develop formal models incorporating trade in vintage models.3 Grubel (1980) was
¯rst to bring the idea over to consumer goods and in particular cars. He argued for the removal
of barriers to free trade in used cars claiming that this would lead to substantial welfare gains
for developing countries. Panagariya (2000) has also made this point forcefully in the Indian
context.
The impact of these arguments is di±cult to gauge. Standard international trade statistics
typically do not distinguish between new and used goods. Active global secondary markets
do exist for some high-priced capital goods such as aircraft, ships, and weapons. Nonetheless,
beyond some scattered sector-speci¯c reports, there appears to be no centralized source of data
on the size of international used good markets. Clothing is a noteworthy exception. The value
of world exports in worn clothing (Harmonized System code 6309) was $990 million in 2001, a
3A pair of papers by Navaretti, Soloaga, and Takacs (1998, 2000) examine the determinants of used versus
new machinery trade using data from U.S. exports of metalworking machine tools. Their results suggest that
technological factors, skill constraints and market size may be as important as factor prices in determining the
choice of machine.
3tiny amount compared to the $146 billion of new clothing (HS 61, 62).4 This discrepancy is
somewhat misleading, however, because the value of worn clothing is very small (about $0.73 per
kilogram). An alternative measure of the signi¯cance of the second-hand market would compare
units or weight instead of value. However, weight data are not available for new clothing.5 The
United States is probably an exception in that it has assigned codes for certain used goods {
including cars { in the Harmonized System used for tari® calculation. Indicatively, in 2001 the
US exported about $17 billion worth of new cars and about $0.7 billion in used cars, while
exports of new and used clothing amounted to $6.5 billion and $214 million respectively.6
Historically, trade in used cars was limited to high-end vehicles such as antiques, limited
editions and models that were sold in some countries but not others. I reckon that the export
of used Japanese cars on a signi¯cant scale began in the 1970s.7 To a large extent, the existence
of this market is due to Japan's stringent quality requirements. New cars in Japan are sold
with a \shaken", a ¯tness warranty that is valid for three years. For the shaken to be renewed
at the end of the three years the vehicle has to go through a rigorous and costly inspection
process. Reported estimates of the average inspection cost start at $1000 and get as high as
$2500. Non-pecuniary costs like time lost are also said to be substantial. Further renewals
are required at two-year intervals. The high renewal cost leads many Japanese consumers to
replace the cars after the shaken expires, thus creating a large supply of high quality used cars.8
Put di®erently, the strict regulations translate to a higher rate of depreciation in the value of
automobiles in Japan than in other countries with looser regulations. It is exactly this di®erential
in depreciation rates that creates the opportunity for trade in used cars.9
As a result, used Japanese automobiles are exported to many countries where cars are driven
on the left-hand side of the road and have their steering wheel on the right. These include
Australia, New Zealand, Cyprus, a number of countries in the southeastern part of Africa, and
even faraway United Kingdom. The fact that the steering wheel of Japanese cars is on the right
is not prohibitive. According to a New York Times report, 200,000 used cars were imported from
4Source: United Nations COMTRADE database.
5A fascinating account of the working of the US second-hand clothing industry can be found in \How Susie
Bayer's T-Shirt Ended Up on Yusuf Mama's Back" (George Packer, New York Times, Mar. 31, 2000).
6Source: United States International Trade Commission online database, DataWeb (http://dataweb.usitc.
gov).
7I base this conjecture on the observation that many Japanese export agents advertise the fact the they have
been in business since then.
8For an account of the e®ects of the shaken policy see \Used Cars in Japan: Young Bangers", The Economist,
Dec. 21, 1991, p.85.
9Clerides and Hadjiyiannis (2004) develop a theoretical model that shows how asymmetric quality standards
can give rise to trade in used durable goods. They also show that high quality standards may be an indirect way
of boosting the domestic industry.
4Japan into Russia (where cars are driven on the right-hand side of the road) in 2002.10 Many cars
also also imported into Russia from the west; a BBC report puts the total of used cars imported
into Russia in 2001 at 360,000. This is likely to change as the Russian government recently
raised duties on second-hand cars in an e®ort to assist its troubled domestic car industry.11 A
recent Wall Street Journal report claims that about one million used cars worth $2.7 billion are
exported every year from Japan.12
Russia is not alone in trying to limit the in°ow of used vehicles. Many other countries
also have regulations banning or restricting the importation of used cars. Just an in Russia,
these regulations are usually designed to protect the local automobile manufacturing industry.
For example, the importation of used cars is severely restricted in the Mercosur countries, India
(since 2001), the Philippines (since 2002), Kenya (since 2000), and others. Even within NAFTA,
Mexican tari®s on used cars have been allowed a long phase-out period that will begin in 2006
and be completed in 2019. Pelletiere (2003) constructed an index of the degree of used car
import restrictions in 132 countries. Only 58 countries are assigned a value of zero, which
implies minimal or no restrictions. Of the rest, 21 countries prohibit the practice outright while
the rest impose restrictions of various kinds. Pelletiere and Reinert (2004) ¯nd that the existence
of a domestic industry is one of the most important predictors of a restrictive policy.
Even countries without a local industry impose restrictions on used car imports. Cyprus was
such an example before it changed its policy. Environmental and safety reasons are frequently
cited, although the interests of new car dealers are probably foremost in policymakers' minds.
Another argument against trade in used goods is that it is more susceptible to fraud. The BBC
recently uncovered a large-scale operation that moved stolen cars from Japan into the UK.13
The New York Times also recently reported on this problem.14
In order to get a sense of the size of this market I searched through news reports looking
for information on the number of used cars imported in several countries. The results of this
search are presented in Table 1. The ¯rst panel lists some of the major destinations of used
Japanese cars. The second panel lists a number of East European countries that are also major
importers of used cars, most of which come from western Europe. The importance of the used
10\Japan's Used Cars Find New Lives On Russian Roads" (James Brooke, New York Times, Feb. 12, 2003).
11\Russia Hammers Used Car Imports," BBC News, Sep. 1, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/2228873.stm.
12Todd Zaun and Jason Singer, \Driving Change: How Japan's Second-Hand Cars Make Their Way to Third
World; Sophisticated Market Handles Big Used-Vehicle Surplus; Way Station in Dubai; Odyssey of a White
Corolla," The Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition), Jan. 8, 2004.
13See http://www.bbc.co.uk/watchdog/guides to/carfraud/ for the story.
14\Japan Battles an Alliance of Gangs That Trades in Stolen Cars" Jan. 6, 2002.
5Table 1: Imports of used cars in selected countries
Mostly from Japan: Mostly from western Europe:
Country Year Used cars Country Year Used cars
imported imported
Australia 1999 25,000 Bulgaria 2001 120,000
Cyprus 2000 10,000 Czech Rep. 1999 145,000
Kenya 1999 30,000 Estonia 2000 12,000
New Zealand 2000 116,000 Hungary 2000 40,000
Philippines 2001 50,000 Poland 1999 200,000
Russia 2002 200,000 Russia 2001 160,000
United Kingdom 1998 60,000 Slovakia 2000 10,000
car market in many of these countries is immediately apparent both in the sheer number of cars
being imported and in their share of the total car market.
3 The policy experiment
There is no automobile production in Cyprus; all vehicles are imported from the major auto-
mobile manufacturing countries. The local market operates on an exclusive dealership system.
Each manufacturer designates a local dealer who is the sole distributor of his products in Cyprus
and thus has substantial market power. Import duties for automobiles were phased out during
the 1990s, with the exception of a 10% duty on cars originating from countries outside the
European Union. On the other hand, cars are subject to very high consumption taxes: an ad
valorem tax which ranges from 80%-130% (depending on automobile size) and a speci¯c (per
unit) tax which also depends on engine size. All taxes are payable once upon registration.
High taxes on automobiles magnify di®erences in the value of cars that are caused by the
high depreciation rates of automobiles in Japan and thus create an obvious trade opportunity.
Prior to 1993 this trade channel had been blocked by Cyprus legislation that prohibited the
importation into the country of cars that were more than two years old. In 1993 this restriction
was relaxed and the maximum allowable age of an imported vehicle was raised from 2 years to
5 years. Thus the gates were opened to the mass importation of used Japanese vehicles.
The full e®ects of the policy change did not appear until 2-3 years later. It took some time
for new dealers to enter the market and set up distribution channels. Asymmetric information
was also a problem; consumers were skeptical about the quality of the new product for which
little information was available. In order to overcome consumer hesitation, used car dealers
6o®ered warranties and other incentives. Their e®orts were e®ective and by 1995 uncertainty
regarding the quality of used imports had essentially been resolved in a positive way.15 Dozens
of new dealers of used cars entered the market following the policy change, most of them dealing
exclusively in Japanese imports.
The new state of a®airs presented a challenge to new car importers. Their reaction seemed
to stem mostly from indignation and they failed to predict the magnitude of the coming change.
Most of them opted not to enter the used car market, even though their already established
network should have put them at an advantage. They also refused to service used imports.16
Conventional wisdom in the marketplace points to a twofold response by new car dealers to the
new competition. First, they lowered prices on new cars, or at least resisted raising prices on
new models. Second, they o®ered improved packages at the base price. Equipment that had
previously been considered an `extra' (such as air-conditioning, electric windows, power steering,
etc.) became a standard feature. Moreover, they lobbied intensely but without success for the
reversal of the policy citing safety and environmental concerns or, recently, compatibility issues
with European standards.
Sales data. I have obtained detailed information on car sales from the Cyprus Road Transport
Department, which keeps track of vehicle registrations. The data includes information on every
car registered in Cyprus between 1988 and 2000. Figure 1 shows annual registrations of new
and used cars for that period.17 The magnitude of the e®ect of the policy change is clearly
illustrated in this ¯gure. Starting in 1995, two signi¯cant changes become apparent. One is an
overall increase in sales volume; the other is a shift in the composition of automobile sales from
new to used cars.
Figure 2 decomposes car imports into those coming from Japan versus those coming from
all other countries. As expected, there is a sharp decline in the sales of new Japanese cars.
On the other hand, there seems to be very little impact on sales of vehicles from other (mostly
European) countries. This picture suggests that the main losers from the in°ux of used Japanese
cars were new Japanese automobiles. This is to be expected to a certain extent, since the two
are close substitutes. Nonetheless, the apparent lack of any impact on sales of new European
cars is striking. An alternative decomposition if provided is Figure 3. Cars are divided into
four categories: small, midsize, large, and SUVs. Although used car sales increased in all four
15In other words, there was no \lemons" problem. This is consistent with a number of studies that ¯nd little
or no evidence of adverse selection in the used car market; for example, Bond (1982), Genesove (1993), Porter
and Sattler (1999).
16The Honda dealer was a notable exception to both of those practices.
17Note that these are ¯rst-time registrations only and do not include transfers of ownership. Hence they do not
include local used car transactions.
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categories, the bulk of the increase seems to be in the midsize category. New car sales dropped
dramatically in the small and midsize categories, but the drop was smaller (if any) for large cars
and SUVs. Overall, the latter two categories experienced the biggest proportional increase in
total sales. This suggests a shift in the size distribution of cars over time, from smaller to larger
cars.
Price data. The price data come from a local car magazine, Odhg￿c & Autok—nhto (Driver
& Car). The magazine has been publishing monthly prices of most major models since 1988.
Various vehicle characteristics (such as horsepower, weight, fuel e±ciency, etc.) are also reported
starting in 1995; only engine capacity and number of doors were reported prior to that. This
dataset has the bene¯t of broad coverage but also the disadvantage that di®erent versions of the
same model might be reported from year to year. I was also unable to locate all past issues, so
data are missing for some months, mostly in the earlier years. The number of models listed per
month ranges from 25 to 57.
The price data provide some informal evidence on the reported quality improvement of
new cars. For example, Alfa Romeo's Alfa 146L appears in the dataset under that name until











1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Japan
All other








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 Impact on new car prices
The data presented in the previous section show a dramatic impact of the loosening of restric-
tions on used car imports on new car sales. One might expect that the increased competition
of used imports also had an e®ect on new car prices. I test for this by estimating hedonic
pricing equations of automobile prices on a set of ¯rm and year dummies and on a number
of characteristics. In addition, I control for exchange rate °uctuations as they shift importers'
10Table 2: Sales and used prices of new and used versions of selected models
Manufacturer Model Price new (PN) Price used (PU) Ratio PU=PN
Honda Civic 12,212 5,381 0.44
Honda CRV 17,566 7,311 0.42
Honda Integra 13,870 6,363 0.46
Mazda 323 8,636 4,318 0.50
Mitsubishi Colt 7,580 4,265 0.56
Mitsubishi Lancer 8,655 4,913 0.57
Mitsubishi Pajero 21,598 10,162 0.47
Nissan Primera 11,369 5,935 0.52
Nissan Sunny 9,817 4,770 0.49
Suzuki Swift 8,657 3,147 0.36
Toyota Corolla 9,468 5,338 0.56
Toyota Land Cruiser 28,222 10,347 0.37
Toyota RAV4 16,209 6,350 0.39
Toyota Starlet 8,615 4,107 0.48
Prices are averages over reported years in 1995 Cyprus pounds.




jt¯ + µm + µt + ¯pect + "it: (1)
where pe
it is the natural logarithm of price (either before tax or after tax) expressed in exporter
currency; w is a vector of product characteristics; µm and µt are sets of make and year dummies
respectively; ect is the exchange rate of the exporting country, measured as units of exporter
currency per Cyprus pound. The coe±cient ¯p is called the exchange rate pass-through or
pricing-to-market coe±cient. It measures the proportion of an exchange rate shock that is
absorbed by the importer. If the importer absorbs exchange rate °uctuations completely then
local prices are immune to exchange rate variation and ¯p will take the value of 1. If, on the
other hand, the entire change in exchange rate is passed on to the market price we will have
¯p = 0.
The results are best viewed graphically.18 The coe±cients on the year dummies represent
the premium paid on a particular model relative to its 1989 price, after we control for quality
and exchange rate °uctuations. Thus a plot of the coe±cients against the year shows the trend
in quality-adjusted prices over time. This is displayed in Figure 4 for two speci¯cations. One
speci¯cation uses price before tax as the dependent variable while the other uses price after
tax. The two ¯gures look quite similar. Apart from year-to-year °uctuations, they both show
18Full results are available upon request.











1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
After tax price
The bold line plots year dummy coefficients from equation (1); dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval.
Table 3: Structural break tests
Price before tax Price after tax
TREND 0.002 (0.004) -0.009¤ (0.004)
POST96 -0.109¤¤ (0.032) -0.059¤ (0.030)
Exchange rate 1.022¤¤ (0.020) 1.016¤¤ (0.017)
Number of obs 214 273
R2 .9983 .9978
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%. Results are obtained from estimating
equation (2). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors given in parentheses.
a substantial one-time drop in prices after 1996. This roughly coincides with the time that the
sales of used autos started taking o®. Although it is not possible to link this price drop directly
to used imports, it seems likely that they were the main force behind it.
In order to quantify the price drop I estimated a variant of equation (1) where year dummies
are replaced by a trend variable and a dummy variable that aims to capture the structural break:
pe
it = w0
jt¯ + µm + TRENDt + POST96t + ¯pect + "it (2)
The variable POST96 takes the value of 0 for years up to 1996 and 1 thereafter. Table 3
presents the results for the variables of interest; coe±cients on manufacturer dummies and
model characteristics are suppressed for brevity.
The results con¯rm that prices in the second half of the sample period were signi¯cantly
lower than prices in the ¯rst half. The estimated price drop is 10.9% of pre-tax price and 5.9%
of after-tax price. The results are stronger in the case of pre-tax price even though there are
fewer observations. The price decline is not as dramatic as the changes in sales, but it's certainly
not negligible. I note also that this drop is a lower bound. As discussed earlier, one of the ways
12new car dealers responded to the new challenge was to improve the quality of the base product
by incorporating \extras" into the standard model. Since I do not have information on these
upgrades, I cannot adjust fully for improvements in quality over time. Thus, if this improvement
in quality did indeed occur, the results here are understating the decrease in quality-adjusted
prices. I also estimated versions of these pass-through regressions that allow the time e®ects to
di®er according to the region of origin (notably Japan and Europe). There is no evidence that
prices of Japanese cars were a®ected more than their European competitors. Again this is in
contrast to the case of sales, where Japanese automobiles were hit much harder than cars from
other producers.
The estimated pass-through coe±cient is essentially one, indicating that importers absorb all
exchange rate shocks. Typical estimates from studies of the automobile market in other countries
are usually lower. For example, in Goldberg and Verboven (2001) the estimated coe±cients range
from .16 to .79 for di®erent countries, with the overall e®ect being .46. The results here suggest
that new car prices in Cyprus are completely insulated from exchange rate °uctuations. This
may be at least partially explained by the fact that many dealers of new Japanese vehicles carry
out their ¯nancial transactions with the manufacturers in currencies other than the yen (usually
the British pound).
The invariance of local prices with respect to exchange rate °uctuations may also indicate the
presence of substantial market power. If new car dealers earn a high enough pro¯t margin, they
may be willing to absorb exchange rate °uctuations in the interest of maintaining stable prices.
This is in contrast to the used car market, where estimates from a similar regression implied a
pass-through of 23.3%.19 Although this level of pass-through is not large, it is certainly larger
than the zero pass-through we obtained for new cars and it may be interpreted as evidence that
the used car market is more competitive than the new car market.
5 Estimation of welfare gains
Theory suggests that trade liberalization can bene¯t consumers in two ways. First, increased
competitive pressure from imports lowers prices of existing products (the \market discipline"
e®ect). Second, the introduction of new product varieties means that consumer preferences are
better matched with existing products and thus consumer well-being is enhanced. The aim of
this section is to quantify the welfare impact of used car imports in terms of these two channels.
This is achieved by specifying and estimating a structural model of demand for automobiles
19The coe±cient on the exchange rate was estimated at .767, with a standard error of .120.
13which is amenable to welfare comparisons in this context. I follow the large recent literature
on this topic in employing a discrete choice model of di®erentiated products.20 Such models
have been used to quantify the bene¯ts of new products ever since Trajtenberg (1989). Two
papers in particular are directly relevant to the present study. Fershtman and Gandal (1998)
estimate the welfare e®ects of a supply interruption, the boycott of the Israeli market by a
number of automobile manufacturers. They estimate demand for automobiles during and after
the boycott and compare consumer welfare in each regime to assess the boycott's impact. Petrin
(2002) quanti¯es the welfare e®ects of the introduction of the minivan in the US market. He
¯rst estimates demand for automobiles, including minivans, and computes consumer welfare in
this market. He then removes minivans from the dataset and calculates counterfactual sales of
all other models in the absence of minivans. Consumer welfare in the counterfactual scenario
is compared with actual welfare; the di®erence between them is the welfare gain from the
introduction of the minivan. I follow a similar approach in this paper. I ¯rst estimate demand
for automobiles using data over a fourteen year period before and after the introduction of
used imports. I then remove used car models from the consumers' choice set and calculate
counterfactual shares of new models. The di®erence between actual and counterfactual welfare
is the consumer welfare gain from the policy change.
The model. Our point of departure will be the nested logit model in the form analyzed by
Cardell (1997) and Berry (1994). I consider a market with Mt consumers. Every period t
each consumer faces the decision of purchasing one automobile among the Jt choices that are
available, or making no purchase (choice j = 0). The Jt products are grouped into G+1 disjoint
sets, g = 0;1;:::;G, which are determined by the econometrician. The outside option is the
only member of group 0. Let Jg denote the set of products in group g. The utility obtained by
consumer i from product j 2 Jg in period t is given by
Uijt = eÁaj ¢ exjt¯+®pjt+»jt+³igt(¾)+(1¡¾)"ijt: (3)
for i = 1;:::;Mt, j = 1;:::;Jt, t = 1;:::;T. The vector x includes observable product charac-
teristics such as engine size, p is the price and » is an unobserved product characteristic. The
variable aj denotes the age of the good, hence the parameter Á is a negative number that denotes
the depreciation rate of the utility delivered by the good. The term ³igt(¾) is a group-speci¯c
random coe±cient that allows goods that belong to the same group to contribute a common
component of utility to the individual. The parameter ¾ measures the extent to which products
within the same group are substitutes to each other. As ¾ tends to 1 the group-speci¯c random
coe±cient dominates and consumer valuations for products within the group become perfectly
20Early examples are the work of Bresnahan (1987), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Goldberg (1995).
14correlated. If ¾ = 0 the ³igt term vanishes, meaning that the grouping is irrelevant.
Taking the natural logarithm of (3) gives
uijt = Áaj + xjt¯ + ®pjt + »jt + ³igt(¾) + (1 ¡ ¾)"ijt: (4)
The portion of the utility function that is invariant across consumers can be summarized as
±jt ´ Áaj +xjt¯ ¡®pjt +»jt. This is the mean utility each consumer derives from product j; we
can also think of ±j as the mean quality of product j. The option of no purchase (the outside
good) delivers utility
ui0t = ±0t + ³i0t(¾) + "i0t: (5)
The outside option may include goods that are not included in the dataset like used cars from the
local market, alternative modes of transportation, or even a vehicle the consumer already owns.
The mean utility of the outside good can be parameterized as ±0t = wt°. However, the same
e®ect can be accomplished by subtracting wt° from ±jt and setting ±0t = 0. In what follows
I adopt this normalization because it simpli¯es the exposition. Note that this speci¯cation
assumes away income e®ects.
Every period each consumer chooses from the Jt + 1 options the one that maximizes his
utility. If the disturbance term "ijt has the extreme value distribution then analytic solutions
exist for the group shares (denoted by ¹ sg), for the market share of product j as a fraction of the
total group share (¹ sjjg), for the overall share of product j (sj), and for the share of the outside
good (s0). From these expressions it is easy to derive the following equation that links market
shares to prices, car characteristics and the within-group share:21
ln(sjt=s0t) = Áaj + xjt¯ + ®pjt + ¾ ln(sjjg;t) + »jt; j = 1;:::;Jt: (6)
This is a straightforward linear equation that can be taken to the data. It is well known, however,
that estimation of (6) by OLS will yield inconsistent estimates if the error term »jt is correlated
with price or the within share. This will be the case, for example, if ¯rms observe »jt and take it
into account when they observe prices. Since this is likely, I address the problem by estimating
this equation using instrumental variable methods. I make use of the instruments usually used
in this literature: the number of other products in a given product's group and the sum of the
characteristics of other products in and outside the group. Tax rates are also good instruments
for price.22
21The details can be found in Berry (1994).
22Good discussions of instrument choice can be found in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Bresnahan, Stern,
and Trajtenberg (1997) and Fershtman and Gandal (1998). Note that not all possible instruments are used in
15I note that, because of the dramatic e®ects of the policy change, the dataset exhibits unchar-
acteristically high variation both in the number of models available in di®erent time periods and
in the prices of models with similar characteristics. Viewed from the demand side, the policy
change had two e®ects. First, it changed market composition by causing some consumers to
switch their choice from a new car to a used car. Second, it expanded the market by enabling
consumers who would have otherwise opted out to make a purchase. These substitution patterns
are crucial in identifying the demand parameters of the model.
Data issues. Estimation of the demand model presented above required combining sales and
price data coming from di®erent sources. This presented two challenges. First, the sales data did
not always identify the car model, especially in the early years of the sample. This was handled
through a painstaking process of assigning cars to models on the basis of characteristics. Second,
the number of models for which prices are available is much smaller than the number of models
being sold. I addressed this problem by estimating a pricing equation with the available price
data and then using the results to impute a price for every vehicle. Price was speci¯ed to
be a function of engine capacity, engine capacity squared, the exchange rate, and year and
manufacturer dummies. I estimated separate equations for new and used cars and used the
results to impute a price for every car sold.23 The cars were then aggregated to the model level
and the median price was assigned as the model price. The main advantage of this method is
that it enables us to include all sales. The disadvantage is that we are not using actual prices.24
As a result of the age constraint for imports and the nature of Japanese regulations, almost
all used imports are between three and ¯ve years old. The narrowness of this range and the fact
that sales of di®erent vintages of the same model are quite small forced us to lump all vintages
together in one group. Hence, for the purposes of the demand model, all used cars are assumed
to be of the same age. The age variable ajt reduces to a dummy variable taking the value of 0
for new cars and 1 for used cars, and the parameter Á measures the four-year depreciation rate.
Demand estimates. The model was estimated using data for the period 1989-2000. As is
common in models of automobile demand, the di®erent models were split into groups on the
basis of engine size. I created three size categories (small, medium, large) and a fourth group for
estimation because of multicollinearity problems.
23In the used car pricing equation it was not possible to identify both the exchange rate and year dummies
because all cars come from the same country. I chose to use the exchange rate.
24Using an estimated regressor adds variance to the estimates which should, in principle, be accounted for.
On the other hand, models of this type always require the aggregation of di®erent editions of models into one
nameplate. List prices are also used, as opposed to transaction prices. The variance introduced by the estimated
regressor is probably small compared to the measurement error from these sources.
16Table 4: Demand estimates
OLS IV
Structural parameters
® -1.76e-5¤¤ (6.02e-6) -2.59e-4¤¤ (7.39e-5)
¾ 0.830¤¤ (0.018) 0.401¤¤ (0.117)
Á 0.036 (0.085) -1.938¤¤ (0.642)
Model characteristics
Engine size -1.677¤¤ (0.211) 1.041y (0.562)
(Eng. size)2 0.273¤¤ (0.041) 0.304¤¤ (0.109)
Engine power -0.002y (0.001) -0.004¤ (0.002)
Diesel 0.354¤¤ (0.111) -0.465y (0.248)
Cylinders 0.057 (0.047) 0.244y (0.130)
Country dummies (relative to Japan)
CzechRep -0.496¤¤ (0.136) -1.797¤¤ (0.325)
England -0.640¤¤ (0.081) -0.023 (0.198)
France -0.777¤¤ (0.076) -0.699¤¤ (0.159)
Germany -0.728¤¤ (0.076) 0.730¤ (0.292)
Italy -0.783¤¤ (0.087) -0.723¤¤ (0.134)
Korea -0.108 (0.098) -0.639¤¤ (0.207)
Russia -0.602¤¤ (0.090) -2.000¤¤ (0.367)
Spain -0.947¤¤ (0.160) -1.392¤¤ (0.167)
Sweden -1.512¤¤ (0.199) 0.680 (0.632)
Year dummies (relative to 1989)
1990 -0.027 (0.096) -0.024 (0.188)
1991 -0.164¤ (0.084) -0.405¤ (0.197)
1992 -0.156y (0.083) -0.220 (0.187)
1993 -0.715¤¤ (0.105) -0.590¤¤ (0.201)
1994 -0.603¤¤ (0.113) -0.926¤¤ (0.222)
1995 -0.244¤ (0.106) -0.059 (0.187)
1996 -0.078 (0.089) 0.126 (0.195)
1997 0.289¤¤ (0.105) 0.247 (0.190)
1998 0.536¤¤ (0.106) 0.135 (0.210)
1999 0.286¤¤ (0.104) 0.187 (0.199)
2000 0.201¤ (0.098) 0.150 (0.192)
Intercept -3.126¤¤ (0.240) -6.575¤¤ (0.608)
Number of obs 1039 1039
Hansen J statistic (Â2) 2.505 (p-val: 0.286)
F-test 131.07 (p-val: 0.0000) 13.91 (p-val: 0.0000)
Root MSE .598 1.067
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1% .
Reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.
17sport utility vehicles.25 Estimation results are presented in Table 4. In comparing OLS and IV
estimates, recall that the OLS estimate of the price coe±cient will be biased towards zero if the
endogeneity problem exists. This is because price is positively correlated with the error term,
which represents unobserved quality. This is clearly the case here: the coe±cient on price drops
substantially when we instrument for price. Similarly, the coe±cient on the other endogenous
variable, the within-share, is positively correlated with unobserved quality and it also drops once
we instrument for it.
The value of the ¾ coe±cient means that there is a correlation of .401 between consumer
preferences for models belonging to the same group. The median price elasticity corresponding
to the ® and ¾ coe±cients from the IV regression is 5.02, similar to estimates from other
automobile markets. The Á coe±cient implies that the utility obtained from a used car is about
14.4% of that of a new car with the same characteristics. This seems low, but recall that the
basis of comparison is not the price of the same car when it was new but the price of a new car
in the current incarnation of the model. Estimated coe±cients on model characteristics take
reasonable values with the exception of engine power which is highly correlated with engine size.
The signs on country dummies are also what we might expect: German and Swedish cars are
highly regarded, Russian and Czech cars are not. The year dummies proxy for changes in the
outside good. The automobile market's downturn in 1993 and 1994 was a natural lull in the
market after the boom years of the early 90s.
Welfare. With demand estimates in hand, I now proceed to compute welfare. Trajtenberg












where C is the constant of integration. In order to gauge the welfare e®ects of the policy change
I will compare the actual welfare received by consumers to the counterfactual scenario where
no used imports are allowed into the market. The counterfactual scenario is easy to implement
using our framework. We simply remove all used cars from the choice set, re-compute market
shares of new cars under this scenario, and then re-calculate welfare. The di®erence between
the actual and counterfactual welfare measures gives us the welfare gain by consumers.26 The
results are tabulated in Table 5 under the heading `Counterfactual A'. The ¯rst column gives
welfare gain per purchaser and the second one aggregates over all purchasers. In the ¯rst years
25I experimented with di®erent nestings, including two-level nests. Because of the relatively small number of
models per year, the second level coe±cient was never precisely estimated.
26The calculation is essentially the same as in Fershtman and Gandal (1998).
18Table 5: Welfare gains and e®ects on tax revenue
Counterfactual A Counterfactual B
(new car prices ¯xed) (new car prices 10% higher)
Gain per Aggregate Change in Gain per Aggregate
Year purchaser gain tax revenue purchaser gain
(US$) (US$ mil.) (US$ mil.) (US$) (US$ mil.)
1994 11 .1 1.2 11 .1
1995 73 .9 3.4 180 2.3
1996 321 4.3 12.4 416 5.7
1997 671 8.3 32.6 754 9.2
1998 1,048 14.4 45.1 1,142 15.5
1999 615 7.9 34.5 696 8.8
2000 468 6.1 31.4 552 6.9
All ¯gures are in US dollars, converted from 2001 Cyprus pounds at
the 2001 exchange rate CY$1 = US$ 1.7.
gains are small as few used car models are available. In 1996 the gains per purchaser reach $321
and in 1998 they peak at $1,048. The total welfare gain over the seven year period 1994-2000
amounts to $42 million.
How important is this welfare gain? Annual family income during that period was of the
order of $25,000. Taking the numbers for the year 2000 to represent the `steady state' welfare
gain, the gain per purchaser amounts to 1.5% of annual family income. In aggregate terms, the
gain corresponds to 0.066% of Cyprus GDP. This is quite substantial, especially given that it
arises from the opening of a single market. By comparison, the annual welfare gain in Fershtman
and Gandal (1998) from the lifting of the Arab boycott of the Israeli market is 0.30% of Israeli
GDP, while the corresponding ¯gure for Petrin's (2002) minivans is 0.017%.27 The relative
magnitude of the change is reasonable. The market share of minivans in the United States
in the ¯rst few years was a few percentage points. In Israel, by contrast, cars from boycott
companies captured a market share of 30-40% once they entered the market, while in Cyprus
used cars captured 60% of the market.
The scenario analyzed above assumes that prices and characteristics of new cars are the
same under the counterfactual as they are in reality. The evidence presented in the previous
section suggests that this is not the case: new car prices dropped in the second half of the 1990s.
Moreover, the quality of new cars reportedly increased after the in°ux of used imports through
an improvement in the base package o®ered. Our inability to account for these changes implies
27The last two ratios are based on my calculations using information provided in those papers.
19that our welfare estimate is a lower bound. One way to correct for this is to model the supply
side and use an equilibrium assumption to predict prices for the counterfactual. This, however,
requires making additional assumptions about market conduct. Alternatively, one can try to
get a sense of the bias by entertaining di®erent hypotheses on what new car prices would have
been in the absence of used imports. `Counterfactual B' in Table 5 reports welfare e®ects of
one such hypothesis where I assume that in the absence of used imports new car prices would
have been 10% higher. The additional welfare gain from the reduction in prices is relatively
small. As in Fershtman and Gandal (1998), most of the welfare gain for consumers comes from
increased variety as opposed to price changes. In other words, the biggest bene¯ciaries from the
policy change were the individuals who purchased the new varieties; that is, used cars buyers.
Consequently, the gain per used car buyer is substantially larger than that reported in Table 5,
which is averaged over buyers of used and new vehicles.
This last ¯nding relates to an important debate in the international trade literature. The
potential for gains from trade due to increased variety has been recognized at least since Krugman
(1979). Yet empirical evidence of such gains and their magnitude relative to gains from lower
prices is virtually nonexistent.28 The ¯nding here suggests that increased variety is a much
more important channel of gains from trade than increased competition. This has important
implications relating to the distributional impact of the policy. The new varieties introduced by
trade liberalization were of lower quality than existing ones. Low income consumers are more
likely to purchase lower quality goods, hence most of the bene¯ts from the policy change accrued
to low income people. The common argument that trade liberalization hurts the poor simply
does not hold here.
The model allows us to estimate the new policy's impact on public ¯nances. There are two
e®ects. On one hand, tax revenue per car decreased because of the decrease in prices and the
switch to used cars, which are cheaper. On the other hand, more cars were sold. The e®ects
on government tax revenue by year in our two counterfactual scenarios are shown in Table 5.
The estimates indicate that the sales e®ect outweighs the price e®ect, leading to a sizeable
increase in tax revenue. I have been unable to confront those calculations with actual data on
tax revenues. The only data I could ¯nd are for the period 1998-2000. These are reassuringly
close to tax calculations generated by the model for those years, but they are not enough to
test the prediction of increased tax revenue. Given that there have been widespread reports
of tax evasion by used car importers, it is likely that the actual increase in revenue was much
28In a recent study, Broda and Weinstein (2004) calculate gains from variety using aggregate data and price
index methodology. They estimate that welfare gains from variety growth in US imports is 2.8% of GDP.
20smaller.29.
Robustness. The welfare results of this model are robust to various speci¯cations and di®erent
methods of aggregating individual car registrations. At a broader level, however, it is now
well-known that discrete choice models of the type used here make restrictive assumptions with
undesirable implications about the nature of demand. The nested logit model in particular has
been shown to overestimate welfare gains from the introduction of new goods.30 These caveats
notwithstanding, the welfare bene¯t per buyer implied by the results seems quite reasonable.31
6 Summary and conclusions
In this paper I exploit the opening of the Cyprus market to used Japanese automobiles in order
to investigate the e®ects of trade in used goods on consumer welfare. I ¯nd substantial welfare
gains that exceeded $1,000 per purchaser in one year, while I estimate that government also
bene¯ted because of an increase in tax revenue. The bulk of the gains were due to an increase in
product variety and bene¯ted predominantly low income consumers. Gains of similar magnitude
are likely to accrue to consumers in other countries that have been on the receiving end of
international trade in used vehicles. On the other hand, it is important to note that our results
were obtained in the case of a small country that has no automobile production of its own.
This means that the only group hurt by this policy is a small number of new car dealers. The
welfare calculation would be more complicated in a country that has { or wants to develop {
a car manufacturing industry. A second caveat is that our implicit assumption of an in¯nitely
elastic supply of used cars is not always reasonable, especially in the case of large countries.
These caveats notwithstanding, the magnitude of the results is signi¯cant, especially given
the large and largely undocumented volume of international trade in used cars. Moreover, the
scope for even more trade in this market is extremely large. Many populous and relatively poor
countries like India and Mexico are currently almost completely closed to used vehicle imports.
If and when they open up, they are likely to start importing used vehicles in the millions from
the United States or Japan. Developed country consumers will replace their vehicles more
frequently; old vehicles will be shipped overseas. This change in the pattern of trade could also
have an impact on production. Lower demand for new cars in developing countries might slow
29I have not been able to obtain o±cial data to quantify this
30See Ackerberg and Rysman (forthcoming) for a Monte Carlo analysis. Petrin (2002) provides data-based
evidence but his basis of comparison is the simple logit, not the nested logit. Bajari and Benkard (2003) provide
a useful overview of the problems associated with discrete choice models.
31As the owner of two used Japanese imports, I would have had no reservations about paying that extra amount.
21down or even reverse the migration of automobile manufacturing plants to developing countries
if the main reason for this trend is to satisfy foreign markets. On the other hand, production
will not be a®ected if relocation of auto plants is driven by lower production costs overseas.
It is worth noting that exporting countries are also likely to bene¯t from trade in used goods.
The demand from abroad will raise the value of local goods and hence increase the welfare of
local consumers. The e®ect on manufacturers is less obvious. On one hand they lose sales in the
foreign country which switches to used cars. On the other hand the rise in the trade-in value of
their cars will induce domestic consumers to replace their vehicles more often, thus increasing
domestic sales. Given that sales in the foreign country are small to begin with, the latter e®ect
may very well outweigh the former.
Opponents of used car imports usually cite environmental and safety concerns. Although
the right response to that seems to be a good inspection system rather than the prohibition
of trade, one might counter such a system is expensive to set up and susceptible to fraud and
corruption once in place. Although I do not address this question in this paper, I hope to be
able to study the e®ects of this policy in the quality of the car stock in future work.
As the debate on the merits and perils of globalization continues unabated, it is important to
be able to draw lessons from speci¯c experiments in trade liberalization. The policy experiment
studied in this paper contributes to the debate by quantifying the bene¯ts of openness in a unique
and uncontroversial setting. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it points to the previously
overlooked potential of increased international trade in used goods to generate signi¯cant gains
from trade. Although the empirical ¯ndings here are suggestive, further research is warranted
in order to investigate the potential impact of trade in used goods on welfare, trade patterns
and production.
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